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Abstract  
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) to the East in 2004 and 2007 so as to 
include ten former communist countries and two small Mediterranean islands has 
triggered new questions on the nature of EU governance. We argue that the 
accession of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to the EU has affected 
governance patterns in the EU and beyond. Undeniably, the most recent waves of 
enlargement have had feed-back effects on Europeanisation mechanisms (Grabbe 
2006). Also, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) conditionality attached to 
the Eastern partners will likely follow similar patterns. The EU is proud of its 
Enlargement policy, “one of the most successful EU policies”i, and is inclined to 
extend the enlargement mechanisms to future frameworks as the ENP. Through the 
example of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and possibly Belarus, we argue that the 
ENP conditionality contributes to the EU's governance export in the same way the 
preparations for the fifth Eastern enlargement did. Furthermore, we advance the 
idea that complying with ENP conditionality may bring EU aspiring Eastern partners 
closer to accession.  
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Introduction 
 
It has often been said, by scholars and politicians alike, that enlargement is the most 
successful foreign policy tool of the European Union (EU) (e.g. Vachudova 2006; 
Rehn 2008)]. However, using enlargement only as a foreign tool presents the danger 
of maintaining a tension between this policy and other EU foreign policy tools such 
as for example, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This tension requires 
automatically a compromise between these tools. The example of the aspiring ENP 
Eastern countries makes this necessity particularly evident. Indeed, having one or 
the other policies competing, or worst, excluding one another would be particularly 
dangerous for the consistency of the EU foreign action as a whole. Therefore now 
that the majority of European states have joined the EU, there is a need to assess 
what the purpose of EU enlargement is and, by extension, how is it affecting 
governance, especially in the aspiring countries. The subjects of this paper are the 
EU aspiring Eastern partners, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Belarus.  
 
In addressing these questions, we have to first consider the strategic aspect of the 
next enlargement if another expansion to the East, towards an inclusion of the 
Former Soviet Republics (FSRs), is to come on the table. A second consideration is a 
technical one, referring mainly to the question if they and the Union could manage 
their accession. A third could be the question of whether the subsequent enlarged 
EU would still be as effective and efficient in offering deeper integration. The latter 
question is perhaps a little difficult to assess and as such we will leave it outside the 
scope of this paper.  
 
Looking at the first aspect of this issue, the strategic aspect of the EU expansion to 
the FSRs, extending the EU model of governance (however definition we take into 
account for this conceptii) beyond today’s confines and building a safe ring of 
neighbouring friends through enlargement or ENP is a very attractive option. The 
question if the Union has vocation to reach Vladivostok is another, open for now, 
story, which again we will leave outside the present paper. In legal terms, the limits 
posed by the Treaty to the EU’s enlargements concern only the questions if the 
aspirant country is or not an “European state”, without clarifying what this exactly 
means, and second, that the aspirant has to fulfill the 1993 “Copenhagen criteria”iii. 
Based on this, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus cannot, a priori, be excluded, and we 
will show why. The Caucuses states, as well as Turkey and Russia, represent for 
many, borderline cases, although in the case of Turkey the question is clear 
following the 3 October 2005 decision to open negotiations with this state.   
 
In light of this preliminary presentation of the problematique, we will proceed as 
following: in Section 1 we will present the main characteristics of the way the four 
countries comply with ENP conditionality to arrive to enlargement, Section 2 
identifies if indeed there is an “EU governance export” through the ENP 
conditionality the four countries are obliged to apply in order to receive ENP 
assistance, Section 3 analyses, through theories of European integration, the stage 
of their ‘Europeanisation’, of adaptation to they have been socialized with EU rules  
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and norms,  and if and if yes, how does this play in these countries’ case pursuit of 
EU membership. Section 4 assesses an exogenous variable which can play a 
deterring or, on the contrary, an accelerating role in the accession path of these 
three countries: the geopolitics of energy. The last section concludes.  
 
 
Section 1. ENP conditionality: first step towards enlargement? 
 
What determines the European Union (EU) to offer the promise of membership? 
What determined the EU to offer the promise to Western Balkans and why not to 
ENP ex-soviet states as Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus? Does the 
compliance with the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) conditionality engender 
Europeanisation and does this play a role in the way EU grants membership 
perspective to thus Europeanised aspiring states? 
 
Who can apply for EU membership? According to article 49 (TEU), every European 
state can apply for membership. The candidate country addresses its application to 
the Council, which acts unanimously after consulting the Commission and receiving 
the assent of the European Parliament, which acts by an absolute majority of its 
Members. The conditions of accession are laid down in a treaty of accession, which 
is subject to ratification by the acceding country and by all the Member States 
(Article 49 TEU). Later on, another condition was underlying, especially referring to 
the way EU reinvented itself as a as a community bound together by a set of norms 
and forms of governance. It was only in 1993, after the European leaders defined 
additional criteria that the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) were 
offered openly the prospect of membership. The Copenhagen criteria further 
defined the enlargement theoretical criteria, leaving open the door for all countries 
that wanted EU membership. Therefore, the only practical obstacle was the 
fulfillment of the so-called 1993 Copenhagen criteria.  
 
This conditionality is simple as it summarises principles all modern neoliberal 
states are organised according to, but the experience of CEECs shows that it is 
complex in implementation. The attractiveness of the EU as a modern form of 
political organisation made the conditionality unquestionably when aspirant 
countries try to adhere: they understand the fact that even without concrete 
promises, the conditionality is not up for discussioniv.  
 
The EU exerts a fascinating attractiveness for the majority of states and people of 
Europe who experienced authoritarian regimes. Now, it seems to be the case of 
those which separated from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The EU on the other 
hand does not seem to have found the appropriate response to those claims and the 
reassuring answer to the existing EU Members anxiety that the bigger EU is 
becoming the more unmanageable will be. However, in June 2003, the European 
Council assembled in Thessaloniki recognized the Western Balkans states, Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo, as potential  
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candidate states. As for the former soviet states (FSRs), the EU relegated them to the 
recently inaugurated and renewed with the ENP’s Eastern Partnershipv.     
 
What is the position of the thus-relegated countries with regard to membership? 
With the exception of Belarus and Russia, the EU’s Eastern neighbours intend to 
acquire a perspective for EU membership in the near future. Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia, Armenia have been making explicit their objectives to achieve full 
membership. Moldova is active in finding strategies to make itself attractive to the 
EU (Verdun and Chira 2008), especially by proving that its case is similar to the one 
of most Western Balkans countries to which the EU had opened the possibility of 
membership up. Ukraine seems to be selective and sequential in applying the ENP 
conditionality but it is successfully muscling up its way through the January 2009 
gas transit crisis even though only a month before it has been refused a NATO 
accession road map. Georgia is deep in crisis after the August 2008 conflict and does 
not seem to recover under Sakashvili’s leadership to accede at least to NATO. All in 
all, it seems that in these countries` cases, complying with Copenhagen 
conditionality type will not be enough. However, this is the first step and these 
countries have the example of the CEECs, which even before obtaining a clear 
membership promise in the early 1990s, have embarked on the road of 
implementing intensive democratic reforms in order to meet the EU requirements.  
 
A reality check is here necessary. What the Eastern partners are promised under the 
ENP is just financial and diplomatic support from Brussels. To stall time, the EU 
came up with an alternative, the Eastern Partnership, which proposes boosting ties 
with Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Belarus as a reward for 
democratic and free market reforms.  
 
Under the new European plan, the countries mentioned will be offered financial aid, 
conditional free trade pacts and an even easier travel regime for their citizens (this 
could go as far as implementing visa free regimes), as well as new association 
agreements to be negotiated with the EU. In brief, under the 3 December 2008 
proposed Eastern partnership the EU is trying to show that the EU will do more, in 
order to have these countries give up the accession dream at least for now. 
 
Table: The Eastern Partnership (Source: European Commission: Eastern Partnership 
2008, IP, 3 December 2008) 
A stronger political bond The EU strives to raise the level of aspiration by offering new Association 
Agreements to those partner countries that are willing and ready to take on far-reaching commitments with 
the EU and that meet the essential conditions of ENP. 
Improved market access and promotion of free trade areas The Association Agreements will include 
the goal of establishing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with each partner country, once they 
have joined the WTO, free movement of goods, capital and services much like the internal European 
market does. On a multilateral basis, encouraging partner countries to develop a free trade network between 
themselves, which could, in the longer term, join up into a Neighbourhood Economic Community. The  
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new Eastern Partnership can help partners to develop the necessary capacities required to move closer to 
this goal.  
Increased mobility between the European Union and its Eastern Partners The European Union is 
willing to gradually open its borders in a secure and controlled way. The Eastern Partnership foresees 
offering “Mobility and Security Pacts” to promote legal movement of people. A phased approach is 
foreseen for the Visa policy which aims at initiating talks on visa facilitation with partners, providing 
additional facilitation including the waiving of fees, improving Member State consular coverage through 
Common Visa Application centres and, in the longer-term, open dialogues on visa-free travel with all 
partners.  
Mutual energy security The EU aims at including Energy interdependence chapters in the Association 
Agreements with Eastern Partnership countries. In this vein, the EU strongly advocates the negotiations on 
Ukraine's and Moldova's membership in the Energy Community as well as the signature of Memoranda of 
Understanding on Energy Security with Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. The EU intends to enhance the 
political engagement with Azerbaijan, as a major hydrocarbon exporting partner to the EU. Finally, a 
Commission-Belarus declaration on energy, covering hydrocarbon transit and energy sector reform should 
be discussed. 
Comprehensive Institution-Building Programme  
Support for economic and social development The Eastern Partnership will help to tackle the less 
developed regions  
Multilateral initiatives of the Eastern Partnership A multilateral track will support individual 
countries' efforts by providing a framework in which common challenges can be addressed (seminars).  
- five high profile flagship initiatives:  
1. Integrated Border Management Programme Border Management should be aligned to EU standards, 
a prerequisite for the progress on the mobility of persons. 
2. Small and Medium sized Enterprise Facilities - giving an external stimulus to small and medium 
enterprises through technical assistance, risk capital and loans. 
3. Regional electricity markets, renewables and energy efficiency - the integration of regional electricity 
markets, improving energy efficiency and increased use of renewable energy sources. It also includes the 
interlinking of the electricity grids.  
4. Southern energy corridor - a key infrastructure initiative serving to diversify transit routes and sources 
of supply for the EU and its partners. 
5. Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters  
Implementation and Structure of the Eastern Partnership Biennial summits plus annual meetings of 
Foreign Affairs Ministers to review. 
Current EU Financial Funding in the Eastern Partner Countries 
The European Union already provides funding to the Eastern Partner countries for bilateral programmes 
under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). Between 2007 and 2010 spending is as 
follows: Armenia 98.4 million Euro; Azerbaijan 92 million Euro; Georgia €120.4 million Euro (additional  
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funding up to 500 million Euro will be available for Georgia to cope with the consequences of the crisis in 
August 2008); Moldova 209.7 million Euro; Ukraine 494 million Euro.  
 
 
 
Continuity with Enlargement Policy 
 
Despite the fact that the ENP is to be a different policy and with the efforts to have 
the Eastern partners desire something different than accession, the ENP closely 
mimics concepts and instruments first developed by the Commission in the 
preaccession process of the CEECs and replicated in the SAP used by the EU in the 
Balkans (Kelley 2004; Magen 2006).  As a result, in many respects this policy might 
involuntarily prepare neighbouring states for membership despite the rhetoric that 
this is not its aim.  
 
There are a number of reasons why this policy can be considered as a preparatory 
path to membership. From an EU perspective, there was a desire to replicate the 
apparent success of enlargement as a verified instrument of EU foreign policy whose 
methodologies could be adapted and used again. A key feature of the ENP solution 
structure, at least formally, is the political and economic conditionality. The EU links 
the award of perceived goods (market access, and technical and financial assistance) 
to the acceptance of its rules regarding political, legal, and economic domestic 
conduct. Indeed, the external Europeanisation structures pursued by the EU 
(enlargement, SAP, ENP) follow mainly a strategy of “reinforcement by reward”. 
Moreover, at the bureaucratic level, the Wider Europe Task Force (i.e. ENP) was 
originally staffed by officials from both the enlargement and external relations DG’s, 
and practically all of the senior professionals responsible for the ENP’s development 
have transitioned to the new policy domain from work on enlargement or the SAP in 
the Balkans.” (Magen 2006: 397). Nobody denies the export of mechanisms from the 
eastern enlargement (fifth EU enlargement to eight CEECs and two Mediterranean 
countries in 2004 and to the last CEECs Romania and Bulgaria in 2007). On the 
contrary, all interviewees (Nov. and Dec. 2008 authors’ interviews with civil 
servants responsible of enlargement, ENP and political representatives) agree that 
the mechanisms which made the pride of the “overall successful” eastern 
enlargement - TAIEX, twining, etc. - are very much the same mechanisms of the so-
called “Europeanisation East”. How do they work and what is their transformative 
influence towards achieving the aim of EU accession in the selected countries, the 
keen Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus? 
 
Early ENP pronouncements make conscious references to the Copenhagen criteria 
and the acquis communautaire as appropriate guidelines for the ENP countries. The 
Wider Europe Communicationvi provides that “the acquis offers a well established 
model,” and it conditions the granting of economic and political ties to compliance 
with the acquis. The same pattern of imitation is evident in the ENP Action Plans, the 
agreements concluded between the EU and ENP states and its actuality and validity  
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stressed in the Eastern Partnership Communication from 3 December 2008. The EU-
Moldova Action plan signed in February 2005 for example, made provision that the 
authorities from Chisinau will receive support from Brussels in order to harmonize 
its legislation with the acquis. Together with the Country Reports, the Action Plans 
constitute the main instruments of the ENP’s system of inducing and monitoring 
compliance.  
 
As for the perspective of the Eastern European neighbouring states, there is 
evidence that these states do not implement the reforms requested from Brussels 
only for short term advantages, such as market access, reduction to trade barriers, 
technical and financial assistance, visa facilitation. They indeed consider that these 
reforms represent a preparatory stage for EU membership. 
 
 
The Attractiveness of the Enlargement Policy: a Powerful Foreign Policy Tool? 
 
The borderline cases of the countries of the Caucuses, Russia and Turkey are cases 
that challenge the notion of enlargement as a foreign policy tool. If one is to look at 
the strategic importance for the EU from a foreign affairs point of view, i.e. in 
maintaining the best possible relations with each of them, enlargement is the way 
the EU can do this: first, by answering the accession aspirations of each of them, and 
the way it deals with Russia, as one possible barrier to the FSRs EU integration. 
 
The most courageous EU bureaucrats find themselves fearful of successive vetoes in 
the Council for eventual next enlargements. For now, they are committed to the 
agreed enlargement agenda, as it has been spelt out in the 2006 “Renewed 
Agreement on the Enlargement”. They are also jealous of the success of the fifth 
enlargement, and would not change an iota in what the Council agreed of fear of 
diminishing their mandate even further, and thus compromising their dearly loved 
policy. Yet, they agree that progress in the way of reforms and voluntary compliance 
with the Copenhagen criteria may position any aspiring countries in a privileged 
position to be considered if the political momentum presents itself, i.e. if the political 
determination will come to be sustained by a miraculous change of mood within the 
EU member states public opinions. But for the moment the EU is extremely prudent 
in extending the enlargement agenda as it fears disapproval by the public opinion in 
EU member states. At the same time, nobody says that the accession of these 
countries is indefinitely off the table. Quite the contrary: if the political momentum 
presents itself, the progress in the way of reforms will likely bring the same results 
as that of the past few yearsvii. Exogenous factors as Russia’s desire to keep these 
countries under its influence did not deter the political and reforms flow since the 
ENP inspired Action Plans have been put in place. And there were reasons to fear 
Russia’s unhappiness in the matter. The inclusion of Belarus, for eg., the co-member 
of the “Union State” with Russia, could be especially painful for Moscow in a moment 
of stagnation of integration with this neighbouring state. It was just a few years ago 
that Belarus was contemplating deeper integration with Europe (for example 
introducing a monetary union). Under these circumstances, where a process of  
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implementation of the ENP-inspired EU-respective country Action Plans brings 
about applauded reforms by the EU, plus a favorable political momentum, a promise 
of membership is to be expected. 
 
 
Section 2. Is there an “EU governance” export through the ENP? 
 
The first eastern EU enlargement was a success overall, even if not without criticism 
from the general public preparing one aspect or another. Yet quite a few more 
objections should be expected from the general public and in most Member States if 
the existing enlargement agenda is to be expanded. Broadening the agenda is 
perceived as a risk of weakening the Union. Furthermore, even the enlargement 
policy itself may come under increasing criticism. Indeed, expanding again soon may 
bring risks of diluting the objectives of the Union and delaying important internal 
reforms that can only further weaken the Union’s capacity to deal with further, well 
prepared, enlargements. Thus, even its proponents of further enlargements are for 
the moment inclined to oppose extending the agenda, working exclusively under the 
slogan “the agenda is the one we have” and we have to just “consolidate it”. 
 
This means first of all dealing for now with the Balkans under the pretext “we 
cannot leave a hole in the middle of the EU”. The next step is to proceed with 
Turkey, following a political decision that has already taken. Both groups of 
candidates, the Balkans and Turkey, present tremendous challenges for the Union. 
Ensuring the success of the process of integrating harmoniously these candidates is 
a tough task.  
 
For the Eastern Partnership countries, the implicit promise if reformsviii, hope that 
these countries might join is a driving force to apply the conditionalityix. The EU is 
acting under the umbrella of applying the ENP conditionality for disbursing the 
ENPI aid, both sides have an expectation that this is a first step towards accession 
conditionality.  
As for a time perspective, the EU officials are adamant that we only have to talk 
within the framework of the 2006 “Renewed agenda on enlargement”, which ... 
excludes talking about enlarging! Even saying “further enlarging later”, i.e. 
enlargement further the present agenda is out of question. Talking about a 
timeframe is excludedx. In brief, the FSRs have the right to apply under the Treaty, 
but we cannot know if the moment will come that the EU can assess their 
application. Yet, some talk that playing by the rules may bring a promisexi. 
 
What of each of these countries? 
 
Moldovaxii 
 
At the moment the Moldovan political elites’ bet on EU membership appears the 
most supported in the polls (77%).xiii This orientation was the safest internal 
political strategy to ensure the communist party’s re-election and permitted an  
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alliance between communists and the opposition to advance European integration. 
The adaptation in view of resembling EU candidates to membership has implied 
without doubt that Moldova had to incur considerable political costs (Russia’s 
concern about this development, stemming from the more general over EU 
enlargement to the East - which has been watered down by EU’s support to Russia’s 
WTO accession - is a case in point).xiv But given the advantages Moldova acquired 
through the ENP, and more opportunities to open up naturally through the open 
relationship with the EU Member States, especially with neighbouring Member 
States, we can therefore safely assume that Moldova’s embracing of the EU 
integration aim, is rather steadfast, it brings ‘increasing returns’, and changing it 
would not serve any logical political purpose, electoral for the party in power or 
ensuring Moldova’s a safe international stand.  
 
Moldova’s communist ruling party plays nonetheless a double card. In the context of 
its diminishing popularity, the governing Moldovan communist party is using the 
East (Russia) – West (EU, NATO) disagreements, especially the disagreement 
towards the Russia’s missile program, to attract political capital. First, it is playing 
some of its cards to get Russia to agree on some concessions over Transnistria. This 
strategy can work in the context where Russia, as the legal successor of the Soviet 
Union and where Yedinaya Rossiya (‘United Russia’) Party of the powerful Putin-
Medvedev couple is growing in influence, is sensible, as it is interested on keeping 
former soviet Republics on its influence sphere, by contributing to solve their 
internal issues. Russia could therefore be willing to agree to temporary and 
inconsequential concessions to solve the Transnistrian conflict if this helps a 
complying Moldovan government. Second, as the role of the EU in the region and the 
popular supportxv for EU integration is strong in Moldova. The party uses language 
that indicates clearly its support of Moldova’s integration into the EU.  
In the case of EU’s vision for Moldova we can argue that the EU kept a safe, 
unassuming and unengaging position: EU cannot be accused that it does not fulfil its 
promises of including this country in the club for the simple fact it never promised it 
membership!  
 
Ukraine  
 
Ukraine is no longer seen as a slightly corrupt country. The reforms and the more 
frequent access of Ukrainians to travel in Europe and of Europeans to Ukrainians 
resorts for e.g., may sustain a more favourable view of the EU member states public 
opinions towards Ukraine’s accession.  
 
As for its EU perspective, Ukraine has always wanted to draw the parallel between 
the mechanisms in place now, through ENP, and the enlargement accession 
negotiations process (the adoption of the acquis). Ukraine would like a more 
thorough screening, which everybody agrees is an influential and significant. 
Certainly, there are similarities with the enlargement screening, but no monitoring 
although some elements exist under the ENP, and not the same depth, and certainly  
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not a similar political dialogue as the carrot/stick logic does not apply. In 
conclusion, the dialogue is weaker as no pressure possible from the EU.  
The same objective exists, but the approach may differ from country to country. 
There are for sure variations between Ukraine and Georgia, for example, and 
Moldova seems entitled to what Ukraine gets. One can look at the different ENP 
reports, it is difficult to assess what the impact of the ENP monitoring has been. 
Moldova, for example, the principal motor of reform is the ENP – prompted Action 
Plan – and this has certainly had an impact but one has to look carefully at its real 
impact.  
 
Georgia 
 
In Georgia, where the support towards EU accession is quite strong, one has to ask 
himself if this support is going to be ultimately accompanied by the political one. As 
in the other eastern partners, in Georgia the political will is the strong variable, as 
well as the implementation of the acquis which is in the same time the strongest 
challenge.  
 
Belarus 
Since the Russia’s invasion of Georgia followed by the recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia has created a new, favorable reality with regard to Belarus. Indeed 
Russia today is seen by some, possibly even many, as posing a security threat to its 
neighbours, Belarus and Ukraine at first. The EU thus seems to have changed its 
strategy towards Belarus. On 17 December, the EU’s High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana welcomed the decision of the 
Belarusian Ministry of Justice to register the For Freedom movement, the key 
opposition force led by President Alexander Lukashenko’s staunchest opponent 
Alexander Milinkevich. In Solana’s words, legalizing the For Freedom movement will 
“further support positive developments in the relationship between the European 
Union and Belarus”. The EU current strategy towards Belarus is in line with the ENP 
and the new Eastern partnership.  
By virtue of their geographical location Belarus and Ukraine are likely to be more 
strongly influenced by impulses coming from the EU than countries further away in 
the periphery. The EU’s new Eastern Partnership, due to be formally endorsed in 
spring next year, is a sign that the EU is prepared to make an effort to engage its new 
neighbours in a more structured relationship.  
Of course in the current circumstances significant budgetary commitments 
proposed by the European Commission (600 million euro to be spent in 2010-2013) 
may be watered down. The prospect of opening European borders in due course for 
the neighbours to move freely may also run into opposition. And yet some new 
incentives are there. Will they be big enough?  
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Section 3. Towards Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus’ EU membership? 
 
In light of these developments, what kind of predictions offer the theories of 
European integration to the EU fate of these countries, Moldova, Ukraine, and 
Georgia, for which EU membership is not yet in the cards. These countries, keen in 
acquiring an EU perspective, are assigned to a more restrictive framework, the ENP, 
but an Europeanisation process is under way: how does this play in these countries’ 
pursuit of EU membership? 
 
Borrowing from theories of European integration we can offer discern two 
explanations that offer insights into why first Moldova, Ukraine, and possibly later 
Belarus and Georgia, may or may not be granted candidacy status. The first one, 
‘rational intergovernmentalism’ (Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003) 
suggests that candidacy and ultimately membership is offered when the prospective 
candidate country has something to offer the incumbent EU Member States. This 
will confirm the argument of those who say that the next eastern enlargement will 
be accomplished on a strategic basis. And this generally refers to the security of 
energy supply. Indeed, the EU may be interested in obtaining energy security by 
associating these countries. Indeed, Ukraine is the only country with a secure and 
modern transit system for the main gas supply for the EU, the gas from Russia. 
Belarus has the most modern compressing facilities for this gas. Georgia is an 
important transit country for oil from the Caspian, and an alternative route to 
Europe. Both can therefore be important to secure alternative supplies of oil to the 
continent in order to get it independent from Russia and the Middle East. These 
arguments would have stand until now too. The fact that the EU Member States did 
not agree in the Council for a membership offer to these countries speaks of the 
uncertainty of what there is to gain from these countries at this time, and what to 
lose if Russia finds these arrangements awkward in its relations with the EU’s 
Member States. Thus, the theory provides us with insights, but also has its limits.   
 
A second approach ‘social institutionalism’ focuses on whether a country (here: 
Moldova, Ukraine, in first instance, and Belarus and Georgia possibly in a second 
instance) has incorporated norms and values resembling those of the EU (the liberal 
norms of social and political order in the domestic sphere, and in democratic peace 
and multilateralism in the international arena). Following this logic, the eastern 
partners, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to 
consider the EU rules as having an intrinsic value, regardless of the material 
incentives for adopting them (Börzel and Risse 2003; Kubicek 2003: 14-
15; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 19). This follows from the logic of 
democratisation through reforms these countries seem to follow, in a more or less 
uniform pattern, and independent of a strategy designed to convince the EU of their 
candidate suitability.  
 
We argue that these two approaches do not satisfactorily explain the eastern 
partners’ case. The rationalist intergovernmentalist account might very well explain 
the present political situation in Eastern Europe. However we would argue that  
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there is good reason to believe that weighing only “what’s in for us”, as the 
rationalist intergovernmentalists would do, would only offer a partial explanation of 
the phenomenon of the FSRs obtaining a promise of membership from the EU.  
Moreover, if the eastern partners complied with the rules and regulations required 
by the EU (Copenhagen-type requirements) opposition by individual Member States 
to these countries’ requests to be considered for membership will lose its influence 
in the negotiations. As for the social institutionalist approach, it seems unable to 
account for the importance of political motivation as a drive for seeking EU 
candidateship – something that our research has suggested as a major force. From 
our research we noted a keen awareness on the part of the interviewees in the 
studied countries that by adjusting to EU rules membership might follow, and that 
positioning the country so that it would have a better chance applying for 
membership was a worthy objective. Moreover, these theories are designed to 
explain the behaviour of countries with an accession perspective, which is not the 
case of our countries. In other words we feel the existing explanatory approaches 
are inadequate to explain our findings. As such the policies of these non-invited, 
potential candidate countries of the future are ‘under-theorised’xvi, or ‘suffer from 
almost reflexive reliance on prior models (i.e. explaining the first eastern 
enlargements) which may not be suitable to the challenges the ENP attempt to 
address’.xvii  
 
The theory we suggest to decrypt the trend the EU may follow in considering the 
aspiring FSRs is the ‘increased returns’ theory. Paul Pierson’s (2000) ‘increasing 
returns processes’ theory could offer what we think may be a more valuable 
framework as to why the aspiring FSRs’ efforts create path dependence towards EU 
accession. The basic idea is that aspiring FSRs’ efforts to converge with EU rules, 
through legal and institutional adaptationxviii, together with the country’s 
geopolitical situation and the support from EU Members States will put the 
countries in a good position to be eventually granted candidacy status. Unless 
‘exogenous factors’, such as, for e.g., Russia’s pressure, armed conflicts, effects of the 
international financial crisis, etc., derail the process, we argue that aspiring FSRs’ 
will likely achieve the required degree of political and economic reform, as well as 
administrative capacity to cope with EU membership.  
 
An explanation in light of this analysis points to the capability of the eastern 
partners to persuade the EU of their stability and their success in proceeding 
towards membership once and if the political momentum presents itself. A series of 
phenomena can produce increasing predictable courses of political events in 
Moldova, Ukraine, in first instance, and Belarus and Georgia possibly later on, 
towards ‘a single optimal outcome’ (Pierson 2000: 253), in our case, EU 
membership. A vision of ‘political equilibrium’ towards which the theory of 
‘increased returns’ points out, which in our case is European integration, is an 
attractive aim in these countries where pollsxix show increased popular support. The 
reverse, ‘steps away from equilibrium’ (Pierson 2000: 254) are more difficult than 
the ones before, and not safely to assume politically unless set to lose electorate.  
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The ‘increasing returns’ approach suggests that the benefits of any individual action 
or those of an organization are often enhanced if they are coordinated or ‘fit’ with 
the actions of other individual actors or organizations. The case of Moldova and 
Ukraine’s legal and institutional adaptation to embrace the acquis communautaire 
particularly fits this description. The same approach points that it is best to ‘bet on 
the right horse’. For Moldova and Ukraine politicians, as well as Georgians, this 
means to bet on the political choice ensuring the highest electoral returns, i.e., 
European integration. At the moment the wrong horse seems to be for the three 
eastern partners to align its foreign policy to Russia (which may change 
unexpectedly as during Russia’s sudden embargo towards Moldova’s products and 
Moldova’s exclusion from the CIS trade agreement in 2003, during pressure towards 
Ukraine and armed intervention in South Ossetia in relation to Georgia). But as the 
approach suggests, actors must constantly adjust their behaviour to how they 
expect others (in this case, the EU and Russia, as well as the United States for the 
eastern partners seeking NATO membership) to act. If the EU does not commit, 
disappointment and accession ‘fatigue’ may take the overhand. In that case, EU 
membership may become the ‘wrong political horse’ to bet on, especially if Russia 
becomes more light-hearted towards its former satellites seeking now EU 
membership. So our analysis suggests also that while seeking EU membership, there 
may be time sensitivity for the eastern partners to adapt to the EU rules. For the 
moment, membership is not on the table, but the Association agreement to which 
the way is freed now since the adoption of the Communication or 3 December to 
further associate the Eastern partners, may offer a very profitable to bring closer 
these countries to membership should the right momentum come. Let us turn to a 
discussion of some of these countries. 
   
 
Section 4: A deterring Exogenous Factor? The Geopolitics of Energy and the 
aspiring FSRs’ EU Integration 
 
In this section we will assess an exogenous variable, the geopolitics of energy, a 
factor that can play a deterring or, on the contrary, an accelerating role in the 
accession path of these three countries. 
 
Energy is a powerful foreign policy instrument in the Kremlin’s hands. The price 
that Russia’s neighbours and perceived satellites nowadays, in contrast with the 
times of the Soviet Union, pay for gas, when it was practically free, is relevant. In the 
past it was free, now it is close to half the Western Europe pays which is very high 
fro these countries. The same goes for the transit of oil and gas.  
 
Ukraine is trying to muscle up its way by keeping the price of transit for the Russian 
gas to Europe high. Moldova and Belarus, less powerful, are doing a double game. 
Moldova’s President Voronin showed to Putin at the CEI Summit in Chisinau in the 
Fall of 2008 that he is happy to give Russia a hand to rebuild the CEI during 
Moldova’s presidency of the organisation in the first semester of 2009. On 22 
December, President Lukashenko went to Moscow in the attempt to negotiate a  
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favourable gas deal with the Kremlinxx mirroring his good will to have the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia recognized by his country, which to 
date are only recognized by Nicaragua and Hamas, apart from Russia itself. Moscow 
is apparently extending preferential treatment to Minsk in gas matters in return for 
its loyaltyxxi.  
By contrast, the EU-Russia relations are to be read from the point of view of 
common interest related to energy offer and demand, as well as transit, hence the 
association to this cooperation of transit`s countries as Ukraine and Belarus, rather 
than from the point of view of the post-Cold War. Moreover, the credibility of EU`s 
energy policy depend on EU’s aptitude in engendering cooperative solidarity as a 
new way of governing resources as energy sources and finding new alternative fuels 
and curtailing many of the activities enabled by today’s conventional fuels.  
The EU is presented with a new chance: to put together potential-conflict feeling 
industries (as it did in the 1950s with the coal and steel), today, the extraction of 
energy generating raw materials, their refinement and the building transit of energy 
infrastructures, and extend its successful model well beyond its borders, towards... 
Vladivostockxxii.  
 
Back to theory… 
 
Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus ‘ EU accession: just one element in a much 
bigger picture? 
 
In light of the account regarding the geopolitics of energy in the part of the world 
subject to our research, more theoretical investigation is to be done. Indeed, in the 
region analysed, it appears that we do not have to do only with a mere 
reconfiguration of the balance of power (premised on changes in the distribution of 
powers across the system’s units affecting only the polarity within an unaltered 
anarchical system of states as international relations realists would argue). 
Likewise, there is no question of traditional state sovereignty under attack, although 
the classical Westphalian system, rooted in the primacy of modern, territorial 
bounded sovereign state is subject to a post-territorial, post-modern (auto-
)transformation. What is sure is that concepts and metaphors borrowed from 
theories of international relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) as 
``empire``,  ``neo-medievalism``,  ``multi-level global governance`` could help to 
make sense of recent changes in the structure of international regimes as the one 
analysed here, i.e., the reconfiguration of power in the post-soviet territory.  
 
As during the post-Westphalian transformation, the reconfiguration of power in the 
post-soviet territory in relation to the exploitation and transport of oil and gas 
derivates is giving us the first glimpse of a new fundamental transformation in the 
structure of the international system. We seem to look at the first post-Westphalian  
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change of the instruments by which foreign affairs are asserted: energy rather than 
arms.  
 
Our case studies are the pieces of a strange puzzle: the intermediaries, allies, 
dependents of one of the biggest sources of energy holders in the world, Russia. As 
far as the world is slowly heading towards the dreaded Peak Oil (the turning point 
for the transition from a century-and-a-half during which the available supply of oil 
grew each year, to a future characterized by declining annual supplies)xxiii, and a 
protocol (as for example the proposed Oil Depletion Protocolxxiv) to regulate it and 
manage it is not in place, energy may trigger an escalation of violence in the 
international arena. This transformation in the structure of the international system 
calls therefore for instruments of global governance able to avail armed conflict. 
Cooperation in a context of multi-level global governance is the instrument able to 
achieve it.  
 
In this context, scholars looking at the EU-FSRs aspiring to accede to the EU are 
often falling into the trap of not contextualizing these countries` relations with other 
international organizations and with other countries, especially their neighbors, and 
looking at the EU-aspiring countries relations just in the context of the ENP. EU 
aspiring FSRs could be the missing link of a more open cooperation with Russia in a 
more multi-layered, global governance of world’s energy supplies.  
 
Thus, one debate looks at whether the study of these kinds of interactions can go 
“beyond traditional, intergovernmental conceptions, to embrace a governancexxv 
perspective” xxvi.  Along with these debatesxxvii, it appears to us that innovative ways 
of governance (as identified in Toemmel and Verdun) seem to emerge in the case of 
the inter-regional politics of energy in Europe concerning EU and Russia, and the 
countries of the region among which our cases. This is not an explored field by the 
theory. According to us, there are two ways of exploring them: an innovative 
governance approach (finding the right combination of methods – hierarchy, 
cooperation, negotiation, competition - which goes into the inter-regional politics of 
energy in Europe concerning EU and Russia), informed with insights from theories 
of European integration, particularly rational intergovernmentalism (“what’s in for 
us”, where all three parts, the EU, Russia and the aspiring FSRs find their count in 
the sharing of common interest), and path dependency (once some mechanisms are 
in place towards the achievement of a perceived optimum political aim, i.e. reforms 
engendered through ENP mechanisms but with a view towards EU integration as in 
the case of our case studies, it is difficult to go back without being politically 
penalised).  But this is the subject of a new research. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The eastern neighbours have the vocation to accede to the EU but the EU is guarding 
itself to commit until the existing enlargement Agenda as agreed in 2006 is 
consolidated. Of course, the hope is there and many of the EU Member States are 
favourable in principle to seeing more of the eastern neighbours acceding.    
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The ENP reports show a mixed picture, however: there is some good progress in 
certain areas whereas less in others. The red thread is the political will and the 
consistency. In Moldova, for example, the principal motor of reform is the ENP – 
prompted ”National Reform Action Plan” EURMAP – and this has certainly had an 
impact on reforming this country’s institutions and laws in the way the EU desires. 
But one has to look carefully at the durability of this impact. In Georgia, the 
incidents in August 2008 as well as the delays in being accepted as a NATO member 
stopped to a tough halt its dreams to get closer to an EU candidate suitable position 
by stopping this country’s impetus to adapt EU rules. The advancement in the way of 
reforms may accelerate the process of integration and if the political will is still 
there, and because things move historically (as the example of the CEECs integration 
and of the very rapid opening in the case of the Western Balkans), we may expect 
any kind of development, including membership perspective.  
 
These countries are relegated to the ENP framework, more cooperation is to be 
expected under the Eastern partnership, and they will be considered one by one in 
the very cautious way to open up to them the perspective of membership. The 
approach to get the EU`s attention differs also from country to country and this is 
according to each country specificities: Moldova is a smaller country, with closer – 
although dysfunctional – ties with an EU members State, Romania; Ukraine is a 
bigger state, richer in resources, which can offer obvious advantages to the EU if it 
joins, but in the same time and for the same reasons, may suffer from stiffer 
opposition from the EU member states public opinions.  Georgia, which can offer its 
important positioning as an important energy route for Europe, was very keen in 
getting closer to the EU. It seems as though its wings have been brutally cut by the 
wakeup call in received in August 2008, and by the geographical handicap. There 
are therefore for sure variations between Ukraine and Georgia approaches to get 
EU’s attention, for example, and Moldova seems to feel that it is entitled to what 
Ukraine gets.   
 
Contrary to any preliminary assertions, the possible governance of energy supplies 
the world face, and Russia implication into that, may on the contrary present the EU 
with the opportunity to come up with alternatives in terms of global governance of 
this matter, and especially through cooperative solidarity. The aspiring FSRs can 
play favorite roles in this regional play, and turn this role in their favor, either 
negotiating their EU entry, preferential prices for oil and gas from Russia, NATO 
entry, etc. 
 
We can therefore assume that these two factors will perpetuate attitudes to make 
these processes endure. And if the other major factor, i.e. EU’s willingness and 
capacity to enlarge, is also in place, we can expect that this country’s European 
integration objective will be attained.  
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NOTES 
 
i Quote from DG Enlargement officials, authors‟ interview, Brussels, Nov. 2009. 
ii To give definitions. 
iii The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 laid down the basic criteria for accession which future 
members would have to meet in addition to the conditions in the Treaty, namely: 1. a political criteria: 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; 2. an economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union; and 3. the full adoption of the acquis communautaire; 
adoption of the common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law. In December 1995, 
the Madrid European Council revised the membership criteria to include also the appropriate adjustment of 
administrative structures between the membership criteria. The Copenhagen criteria further defined the 
enlargement theoretical criteria, leaving open the door for all countries who wanted to accede to the EU. 
Therefore, the only practical obstacle was the fulfillment of Copenhagen criteria. This great conditionality 
machine is simple in essence, while hugely complex in implementation. If you sincerely want to join the 
club, here are the rules you have to respect, namely the infamous 30,000 pages of EU legislation included 
in 29 different negotiations chapters. 
iv Some authors, Heather Grabbe among them, agree, although analysed why aspirant states apply 
domestically with the Copenhagen criteria.  
v European Commission, Eastern Partnership 2008, IP, 3 December 2008, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/762&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en, last accessed 11 January 2009. 
vi Available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf , last accessed 12 January 2009.  
vii As results from authors‟ interviews with DG Enlargement officials, Brussels, 25 November – 2 
December 2008.  
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viii Authors‟ interview, Brussels, 2 December 2008. 
ix Authors‟ interview, Brussels, 2 December 2008. 
x Authors‟ interview, DG Enlargement, Brussels, 25 November 2008. 
xi Authors‟ interview, Brussels, 2 December 2008. 
xii Verdun and Chira, 2008, pp. 
xiii EURASIA, IDIS VIITORUL, AXA, 2008, p.  
xiv In its attempts to keep former satellites within Russia’s influence, the Yedinaya Rossiya (‘United 
Russia’) Party of Vladimir Putin even went on to propose a joint economic area - a kind of a Eastern-
European union to include Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Turkey, Moldova and some other 
countries, aside of integration forms as CIS and GUAM active in the region. The Stolichniye Novosti 
[Capital City News] newspaper of Moscow quoted Russian State Duma deputy Sergei Markov as 
saying that such economic area should be analogous to the European Union, and should use an 
analogous organization model. Yedinaya Rossiya proposing to create an alternative to EU, Infotag, 7 
August 2008. 
xv EURASIA, IDIS VIITORUL, AXA, April 2008. 
xvi Magen, p. 387. 
xvii idem, p. 383. 
xviii Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, 2007, p.2. 
xix To give source. 
xx ‘President Lukashenko had a very good reason to head to Moscow on Christmas Eve. According to 
some reports, he had hoped to secure the price of $128 per 1000 cubic meters of gas in 2009 but in 
the end had to settle for $140 (some sources quote $160). Curiously, neither Gasprom, nor 
Beltransgaz were present at the talks in a sign that the deal was struck at the highest political level 
and that the two companies were virtually irrelevant. Gasprom officials may be unhappy as they had 
hoped to press Minsk into paying 220-230 dollars next year. In the attempt to unpack the non-
transparent price setting mechanism governing transactions between Gasprom and Beltransgaz 
(Belarusian state company 50% owned by Gasprom), experts refer to the existing 5-year contract 
between the two gas monopolists. The contract inter alia prescribes that for 2009 the number “shall 
be calculated on the basis of the gas price paid by Germany minus the 30% export duties (that 
Germany pays), minus transport expenses and minus 20% discount”. The price may be revised only 
once a year to take account of the latest market trends’.  Prokhorova (2008), available at 
http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/our-publications/column/christmas-tale-president-
lukashenko.html, last accessed in 5 January 2009. 
xxi „On the issue of recognition Alexander Lukashenko, who is not a novice in the game of playing 
Russia against the EU, made a smart move leaving it to the recently elected Belarusian parliament to 
decide. By doing so, he can keep on the right side of the EU. If the legislature supports the recognition 
of Georgia’s two breakaway provinces, he may write it off as the downside of the democratic reform. 
But the space for Lukashenko’s manoeuvres is gradually shrinking. From the EU’s standpoint Minsk 
is on probation due to expire in April next year. By then Minsk has to prove that its liberalization 
drive is earnest and sustained. In August Lukashenko took a step in the right direction by releasing 
the last internationally recognised political prisoners. The EU is closely watching this game.’ 
Prokhorova (2008), available at http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/our-
publications/column/christmas-tale-president-lukashenko.html, last accessed in 5 January 2009. 
xxii The idea has been already circulated among theorists of European integration (Schmitter – author‟s 
interview), (Nies, 2008).  
xxiii Heinberg (2006), p. 7. 
xxiv Drafted by Dr. Colin J. Campbell, Heinberg (2006), p. 5. 
xxv Magen, (2007), p.365.  
xxvi The governance approach had its origins in two different sets of conceptual perspectives. The first, 
referring to “governance without government,” was elaborated by Rosenau and Czempiel (1992; see in  
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particular Rosenau 1992) with regard to international relations or, more specifically, to order in world 
politics. In his seminal article, Rosenau argued that, although a global public regime, let alone a world 
government, does not exist, some kind of order is being established. It results from cooperation among 
states, creating international regimes, and from complex interaction between a plurality of actors, both 
public and private or nongovernmental, pursuing different objectives, but all contributing to provide 
common goods and thus to establish order in a globalizing world. The second conceptual perspective is 
rooted in research on changes in statehood at the national level (Kooiman 1993, 2003; Rhodes 1997; Benz 
2004a). In this context, the emergence of new or alternative modes of governance is seen as a reaction to a 
declining capacity of the state to direct economic growth and social progress and to solve complex 
problems of modern societies. Scholars of this approach assume that public regulation and intervention are 
increasingly being shared with or partly delegated to private or nongovernmental actors. This in turn 
requires enhanced coordination between different actors, thus shifting modes of governance from hierarchy 
to cooperation, from regulation to delegated self-regulation, from top-down political steering to horizontal 
coordination. Both these approaches, whether referring to national political systems or to the international 
realm, have in common that they contest the exclusive role of the state in providing common goods and 
shaping public order. (Toemmel and Verdun, 2009, p. 10-11). 
xxvii See Schimmelfennig and Wagner, (2004), pp. 657-660. 